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1 In  May  2013,  Andreas K.  Engel,  Alexander  Maye,  Martin  Kurthen,  and  Peter  König
published an article entitled “Where’s the Action? The Pragmatic Turn in Cognitive
Science” in which they witnessed a “Pragmatic Turn” in cognitive science, i.e. the shift
from  a  representation-centered  perspective  to  a  paradigm  that  focuses  on  the
understanding of cognition as “enactive.” This new paradigm suggested that “cognition
seems fundamentally grounded in action” (Engel et al. 2013: 206). The authors’ use of
the  term  “pragmatic,”  derived  from  the  action-oriented  perspectives  developed  by
John Dewey and George H. Mead, meant to stress the conjecture that “cognition is a
form  of  practice”  (Engel  et  al. 2013:  202),  namely  a  skillful  activity  that  implies
continuous interaction with the outside world. 
2 The  article  anticipated  a  Forum  on  the  “Pragmatic  Turn”  held  in  October 2013  in
Frankfurt in which the debate focused on possible advances in the empirical field of
this new paradigm. The result of the debate involving fifty participants is the volume
edited  by  Andreas  K.  Engel,  Karl  J.  Friston,  and  Danica  Kragic,  The  Pragmatic  Turn.
Toward  Action-Oriented  Views  in  Cognitive  Science.  The  volume  collects  twenty
contributions  that  provide  information  on  critical  aspects  of  action-oriented
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perspectives and collaborative reports on the discussion that ensued, divided into four
thematic macro-areas: “Development, Acquisition, and Adaptation of Action-Oriented
Processing”;  “Action-Oriented  Models  of  Cognitive  Processing”;  “Action-Oriented
Understanding of Consciousness and the Structure of Experience”; and “Implications of
Action-Oriented Paradigm Shifts in Cognitive Science.”
3 In the introduction to the volume, Engel, Friston and Kragic summarize the conclusions
of  the  five-day  forum  by  arguing  that  the  experimental  evidence  from  cognitive
science,  neuroscience,  psychology,  robotics,  and  philosophy  of  mind  support  the
possibility  of  substantial  conceptual  advances  toward  action-oriented  cognition
paradigm. Such advances also refer to “new views on the functional relevance and the
presumed ‘representational’ nature of neural processes” (p. 1). According to the action-
oriented perspective,  cognition should not be considered as a producer of  veridical
representations but rather as an ability to generate action structures.  Neuroscience
embracing this perspective should not focus on explanation of how the brain acts as a
world-mirroring device, but rather as a “vehicle of world-making.” In this respect, one
of the primary references of the pragmatic turn is O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor
contingency theory (SMC) (O’Regan & Noë 2001), which draws on Gibson’s affordances
theory  (Gibson  1979)  as  well  as  on  old  concepts  from  neurobiology  such  as  the
“reafference  principle”  put  forth  by  von  Holst  and  Mittelstaedt  (1950).  Such
contingencies can be identified as relations between movements and changes in the
associated sensory inputs which, once learned, are similar to rules that enable us to
predict  the  consequences  of  our  actions.  Closely  related  to  the  approach  of  active
inference to action and perception is the idea that the learning of such predictions can
be mediated by  the  acquisition of  concepts  of  objects,  as  well  as  predictive  coding
models. Following this path, Maye and Engel’s “pragmatic” proposal (chapter 11) is to
extend O’Regan and Noë’s  SMC theory to what they call  “‘intention-related’  eSMCs,
which capture long-term regularities in action sequences and constitute our conscious
experience beyond the timescale of object perception” (179). 
4 Given that the pragmatic turn is an expression of enactivist approaches, one of the
central  epistemological  issues  is  whether  such  a  pragmatic  approach  to  cognition
should be included in a scientific research agenda or whether it should be considered as
philosophy  of  nature.  In  his  contribution,  Gallagher  (chapter 16)  contends  that,  if
enactivism, which inspires the pragmatic turn, proposed from the outset to rethink not
only the nature of the mind and brain but the very concept of nature, it  could not
accept  a  mechanistic  definition  of  nature  as  presupposed  by  science.  Instead,
enactivism  “contends  that  nature  cannot  be  understood  apart  from  the  cognitive
capacity that we have to investigate it. […H]olism is a strength rather than a practical
complication”  (296).  However,  Gallagher  concludes,  this  does  not  make  enactivism
irrelevant to scientific research; instead, it can motivate experimental science in very
specific  ways  by  offering  or  testing  concrete  hypotheses  or  raising  new  scientific
questions.
5 Along with the question of the general nature of the pragmatic turn, there are many
other  open  issues  that  the  pragmatic  turn  paradigm  has  to  address  in  order  to
contribute  to  this  breakthrough  in  neuroscience,  such  as  the  link  between  neural
mechanisms and memory, complex cognitive processes, the construction of inferential
mental  processes,  and social  cognition.  In chapter 2,  for instance,  Pezzulo faces the
issue of the link between neural mechanisms and higher cognitive processes from a
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developmental perspective, arguing that it is difficult to determine if and how the new
pragmatic view extends to the domains of higher cognition. Assuming that cognition is
“a set of adaptive skills that exist in continuity with action-control mechanisms” (20),
the  author  stresses  that  the  question  remains  as to  how  pragmatic  skills  “support
higher  cognitive  abilities  and/or  bootstrap  them  during  development”  (22).  He
critically  analyzes  three  perspectives  that  emphasize  the  idea  that  sensorimotor
development  promotes  higher  cognition,  namely  the  emergentist perspective,  the
cognitive  mediation perspective,  and the abstract-and-amodal perspective,  pointing out
some open questions that these perspectives pose. More specifically, Pezzulo maintains
that the emergentist  perspective,  according to which the increasingly more complex
(inter)action patterns self-organize during development,  does not  contribute to our
understanding and study of circular causality between development and cognition. On
the other hand, the cognitive mediation perspective, which stresses that certain abilities
developed for the demands of situated action become mediators of higher cognitive
abilities, has some difficulties in identifying the most critical cognitive mediators, while
the  abstract-and-amodal perspective,  which  stresses  that  action-based  processes
contribute to developing cognitive abilities that, once established, become autonomous
from perceptual and motor systems, cannot prove the existence and development of
amodal  domains  of  cognition.  Furthermore,  Pezzulo  maintains  that,  from  an
epistemological perspective, other issues arise related to the representational nature of
prediction-based  mechanisms,  the  use  of  symbols  by  the  brain  to  mediate  thought
processes and the causal role of sensorimotor representations in higher cognition.
6 Another  question  dealt  with  in  the  volume is  that  of  predictive  coding  and  active
inference  based  on  the  Bayesian  paradigm.  In  his  contribution  (chapter 6)  Friston
frames  questions  about  embodied  cognition  and  action in  terms  of  active  inference,
moving toward a view of the brain as a statistical organ that generates unconscious
inferences tested against sensory evidence. Hohwy (chapter 7) takes into account the
idea that the brain is fundamentally engaged in prediction error minimization (PEM)
(see Friston 2010, Clark 2013, Hohwy 2013) and highlights some issues in uniting PEM’s
proclivity for internal processing and the embodied, enactive, extended approach to
cognition, whereas Kilner et al. (chapter 10) take into account possible models of the
interrelationships between action and cognition, focusing in particular on ideomotor
theory  and  drawing  a  formalization  under  the  enactivist  version  of  the  Bayesian
paradigm. 
7 A genuine pragmatist alternative to such formalization is Menary’s “Pragmatism and
the Pragmatic Turn in Cognitive Science” (chapter 13), in which the author interprets
active  inference  in  a  more  pragmatist  vein  as  an  abductive  process.  In  particular,
Menary relates the principle of active inference to concepts of exploratory inference in
classical  pragmatism, arguing that  pragmatists  did not  rely solely on a behavioural
account of sensorimotor interactions with the environment. Instead, they framed the
nature of such interactions in terms of “exploratory inferences” and “transactions.”
According to Menary, a pragmatist approach to cognition relies on three principles: 1)
thinking “is structured by the interaction of an organism with its environment”; 2)
cognition “develops via exploratory inference, which remains a core cognitive ability
throughout the life cycle”; and 3) inquiry “begins with genuinely irritating doubts that
arise in a  situation and is  carried out by exploratory inference” (216).  Moreover,  a
genuinely pragmatic turn in cognitive science would assume a pluralistic approach to
styles of interaction. Thus, although SMCs and predictive inferences are core methods
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for  understanding  cognition  as  interactive,  different  styles  in  interactions  imply
“differences in how we model or explain those different styles” (217). And though in
keeping with enactivism and embodied cognition pragmatists reduced the importance
of representational explanation of cognition, they denied a complete break with the
role  of  representation.  In  line  with  Peirce’s  view,  Menary  looks  at  signs  as
representational  mediators  that  develop  in  the  process  of  continuous  dynamical
interpretation.  He then  refers  to  the  Peircean  Principle  (Menary  2007),  which
establishes  a  sign/intentional/representational  relation  based  on  a  principle  of
continuity, allowing “us to explain how sign action works in both natural and social
environments, by giving the same structural conditions for teleonomic and teleological
signs” (220).  Following the pragmatist  idea of  fallibilism and exploratory inference,
Menary maintains an externalist  interpretation of  the role of  active inferences and
thereby  avoids  an  internalist  view  of  the  Bayesian  brain.  He  refers  to  the  niche
construction  account  of  developmental  biases,  which  are  both  endogenous  and
exogenous,  and  focuses  on  the  selective  role  of  Peirce’s  abductive  inference  as
instinctual. He thus points out that cognition is “shot through with active exploratory
inference  that  is  abductive  –  a  pattern  of  action  that  is  a  search  strategy  for  a
conjecture  that  can be  further  tested” (226).  What  is  particularly  interesting about
Menary’s proposal is that he interprets abductive inference in early developmental and
at  least  sensorimotor  cases  as  based  on  motor  activity  rather  than  on  beliefs  or
representations. It would therefore be possible “to give a nonrepresentational account
of active inference, and this would be entirely consistent with the likely evolutionary
origin of those inferences in sensorimotor interactions with the environment” (226). As
he puts it, this interpretation is also consistent with Dewey’s theory of sensory circuit
and  his  externalist  explanation  of  the symmetrical  transaction  in  organism-
environment transactions.
8 The  perspective  that  Engel,  Friston  and  Kragic’s  The  Pragmatic  Turn promotes  is
praiseworthy.  However,  what  can  be  noticed  in  reading  the  contributions  is  that,
although all  the  essays  are  presented under  the  broad umbrella  of  the  “pragmatic
turn,” which should be inspired by pragmatist authors, there are very few references to
pragmatist authors. The only essay in the volume that contributes to the pragmatic
turn debate by referring to pragmatists is Menary’s. Of course, we appreciate that the
pragmatic  turn in  cognitive  science  somehow reassumes the  scientific  attitude and
experimental approach of the early pragmatists. Nevertheless, however auspicious it
may be,  such an approach seems to  be strongly undermined by an epistemological
premise  that  precludes  the  profitable  use  of  pragmatist  theories  in  contemporary
action-oriented  explanations,  that  is  a  strong  physicalism that  reduces  any  action-
oriented  perspective  to  its  description  in  terms  of  brain  activation,  networks  and
neural structures. Although many contributions in the volume take into consideration
other  aspects  besides  neural activation,  such  as  behaviour  and  social  interaction,
almost  all  take  for  granted  a  focus  on  the  internal  states  of  the  cognitive  system,
identifying them with brain activation,  thus distancing itself  from pragmatists,  and
failing to grasp the richness of their non-reductionist naturalism. 
9 It is possible, therefore, to trace two possible sides of the pragmatic turn in cognitive
science:  on  the  one  hand,  a  physicalist  side  based  on  neuroscientific  and  artificial
intelligence studies, which make use of hypotheses useful to implementing empirical
insights, and, on the other hand, a theoretical side, which promotes a holistic approach
to  cognition,  aiming  to  contribute  to  both  a  new  cognitive  ontology  and  a  new
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philosophy of nature (see for instance Gallagher and Menary). Almost all contributions
to  The  Pragmatic  Turn fall  on  the  first  side.  However,  what  makes  the  perspective
promoted by Engel and his colleagues particularly interesting and the path traced rich
with potential development is that the pragmatic turn is young and strongly influenced
by a discussion of the various aspects of cognition. Therefore, more significantly taking
into  account  the  differences  and  potential  of  pragmatist  authors  would  certainly
contribute to consolidating the empirical and philosophical sides,  highlighting their
natural complementarity.
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